Across Europe, CO 2 emission permits represent one of the main policy instruments to comply with the limits established by the European Commission to achieve the goals of the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper we use microdata to address two issues regarding the impact of the European Carbon Market (EU ETS).
Introduction
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, the European Union has pledged to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was established to that effect by Directive 2003/87/CE. An emission permit system is a pollution-control instrument based on requiring pollution sources to hold transferable permits. The regulator issues the desired number of permits and each source designs its own compliance strategy, including sale or purchase of allowances and pollution abatement. The incentives created by this system ensure that each source has enough flexibility to minimize its compliance costs and, as a consequence, the policymaker's environmental goals are achieved cost-effectively, i.e. at the lowest possible cost for the whole economy.
In spite of the desirable theoretical properties of emission permit schemes, the nature of the EU ETS raises a few efficiency and equity concerns. Cost-effectiveness of any environmental regulation requires a full coverage of emitters, especially when non-subject sectors present lower abatement costs (see Böhringer et al, 2006) . Also, any unequal treatment of sectors generates distributional consequences. For instance, Kettner et al (2008) provide evidence that Phase I allocations favoured large installations relative to smaller ones. In defence of the EU ETS design, a market limited to main emitters is appealing due to a reduction of administrative and compliance costs. Furthermore, there is no evidence of market power, which if it existed would diminish trading efficiency (Convery and Redmond, 2007) . Another problem is associated with the free allocation of pollution permits by most governments, despite the empirical evidence on the superiority of auctioning. Cramton and Kerr (2002) note that auctioning "allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents." This is in line with the conclusions of the literature on revenue recycling through distortionary tax reduction (Parry et al. 1999; Fullerton and Metcalf 2001) . Environmental instruments aim to correct pre-existing market distortions. Therefore, when they are used to raise revenue (such as with environmental taxes or auctioned permits), other taxes which carry deadweight losses (such as labour or income taxes) can be reduced. This type of "green" fiscal reform could thus allow a reduction of the total tax burden in the economy.
A final point is that regulation falls on installations that in turn are anchored in a physical territory. The specialization of the different regions in the production of different goods and services can lead to different economic impacts of the carbon market from a regional point of view. If there is no proportionality between the regional share of affected installations and population, value added or employment, we can expect important distributional effects between regions, in Europe and even within countries.
Regulations minimising distributive and economic efficiency distortions are necessary. Hence it is important to study both the sectoral and regional impact of the EU ETS inside the different countries involved. However, little attention has been paid to the later in the literature 2 . This article focuses on the Portuguese case, analysing both regional and sectoral EU ETS economic impacts. To this end we use data from 2005 and 2006 for 244 Portuguese installations covered by the EU ETS as well as economic 1 For a more complete discussion, Convery (2009) reviews the literature on emissions trading in Europe. 2 The only exception we are familiar with is for the case of Spain (Rodriguez and del Rio, 2008 The data reveal that: (i) Portuguese carbon emissions permits are extremely concentrated in a small number of installations; (ii) the thermoelectric sector was the only one that had a negative balance, and only in 2005, mainly due to adverse weather conditions; (iii) other sectors appear to have benefited from EU ETS participation, some significantly so; iv) a limited number of regions show a high concentration of regulated emissions, surpluses and deficits. Those results, together with the fact that about 60% of the national emissions remain unregulated by the EU ETS, highlight the necessity of considering the full distributive impacts when analysing policy measures.
The article is made up of seven sections, including this introduction. Section 2 describes the European Union's Emission Trading System, whereas Section 3 focuses on the first Portuguese National Allocation Plan (NAP). Section 4 analyzes the sectoral effects of the European Carbon Market in Portugal, whereas
Section 5 discusses its regional effects. The Portuguese NAP for the second period, 2008-2012, is described in Section 6. Finally, some policy implications and the main conclusions are set out in Sections 7
and 8, respectively.
The European Union Emission Trading System
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was established to that effect by Directive 2003/87/CE. It is based on six fundamental principles: i) it is a "cap-and-trade" system (an overall cap is set, defining the maximum amount of emissions, and sources can buy or sell allowances on the open market at European level); ii) it is focused on CO 2 from large industrial emitters; iii) implementation is taking place in two phases (2005-2007 and 2008-2012) with periodic reviews; iv) emission allowances are decided within national allocation plans; v) it includes a strong compliance framework; vi) the market is EUwide but taps emission reduction opportunities in the rest of the world through the use of the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, and it also provides for links with compatible systems in third countries.
The installations covered by the EU ETS initially received allowances for free from each EU Member
State's government, in what is known as "grandfathering". However, since unused permits 4 can be sold, installations are stimulated to invest in emissions reduction even when they are under their "cap" (the grandfathered allocated permits).
Until now, each Member State was able to decide the sum of permits to attribute to the installations regulated by the Directive, following criteria provided by the European Commission. In the two initial phases, a limited number of sectors was included: energy activities (combustion, refineries, coke ovens);
iron and steel (production and processing); mineral industries (cement, glass, ceramic products); and pulp (iv) an opt-out possibility for small installations, emitting below 25,000 ton CO 2 /year, which show alternative reduction measures. These changes will enter into force in January 2013. The package also contains other provisions, such as national binding targets for renewable-energy use and for non-ETS sectors, in order to reach, respectively, a share of renewables in final energy demand of 20% and an average reduction of 10% in these sectors' GHG emissions, by 2020.
In the first year of trading, which was 2005, 362 Mt (million tonnes) of CO 2 were traded on the market for a sum of €7.2 billion, as well as a large number of futures and options (Point Carbon (2006) Table 1 ). This could imply that few additional overall emission reductions have been achieved.
However, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) emphasize that simply comparing emissions with the cap does not take into account abatement brought about by ETS participation. In their analysis, they compare actual emissions with business-as-usual scenarios to show that abatement might actually explain a significant part of the overall Phase I surplus. At any rate, caps for the second trading period have been lowered 9,5% for the EU as a whole.
Some of the EU15 member states had a net "short" position in 2005 8 , notably Spain with the highest deficit (close to 5%). All the EU10 countries, on the other hand, were "long", often significantly so as in the case of the Baltic countries. (2005) (2006) (2007) and up to 10% in phase II (2008 II ( -2012 . In phase I, only four out of 25 Member States used auctions at all, and in only one case were auctions fully employed to the 5% limit (see Hepburn et al (2006) and Ellerman and Buchner (2007) ). 8 Countries are said to be short (long) if they had emissions greater (smaller) than their allocation so that they are potential buyers (sellers) of allowances from (to) other countries, in order to achieve compliance. The same terminology can be used for sectors. 
The first Portuguese National Allocation Plan
The target established by the Directive for Portugal is that during the Kyoto compliance period, 2008-2012, the mean emissions cannot exceed a 27% increase over the emission levels of 1990. Figure 1 Exceptions were made for new installations and for the sectors of electricity generation and iron and steel, where historical data was seen as inappropriate considering technological potential for emission reduction.
Moreover, as in most other EU countries, benchmarking was not used (see Ellerman and Buchner, 2007) .
The actual distribution of permits among the 244 installations covered by the EU ETS was based specifically on two criteria: (i) the historical emissions of each one, which had previously been used for the definition of the total permits assigned to each sector and (ii) combustion emissions assuming an "average fuel" for each activity sector. Individual assignments were given out based on the sum of adjusted combustion emissions with historical emissions. Finally, this sum was multiplied by a factor of global adjustment (equivalent to that used for the calculation of the emissions for each sector).
9 See Comissão para as Alterações Climáticas (2009) Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets
We can highlight from the permit allocation that 10% of installations have 90% of emissions permits. Also, two installations jointly have 31.5% of permits, and there are 163 installations classified as "mini" (less than 25000 tons of CO 2 ), which together account for less than 4% of emissions. Thus it is clear that Portuguese permits are extremely concentrated. This is similar to findings for all EU countries, where Kettner et al (2008) find that the biggest 1,8% of installations account for 50% of emissions. Naturally, regions where these are located will support a large percentage of emission reduction effort. for smaller firms. Still, ETS data indicates that in the first transaction period less than 10% of Portuguese EUA expired worthless (Trotignon and Ellerman, 2008) . One important advantage of microdata is that we can perform a detailed analysis of the potential outcome of the carbon market, with individual data for each installation. Figure 3 shows the wide discrepancies in the net positions held by different installations. Obviously, these discrepancies reflect the interaction between permit allocation, abatement activities, and general activity level. The right-hand tail in this figure, with positive 100% positions, refers to installations that had zero carbon emissions despite having positive permit allocations. On the other hand, those with negative 100% positions represent installations that had to cover double their initial allocations 13 .
Sectoral effects of the European Carbon Market in Portugal
12 See section 3.1 for a detailed analysis of Thermoelectric generation sector.
13 Each year had only one installation (not the same one) with a negative position lower than -100%. These were not included in the figure to minimize scale distortions. Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and SABI data
Thermoelectric Generation Sector
The thermoelectric generation sector deserves a closer analysis because of the bigger effort required of it, the volume of emissions it produces, and also the variability of emissions it shows, depending on the weather patterns that affect hydroelectric production. In Figure 5 (2008)), they focus on temperatures, which only drive demand, and not precipitation, which may also affect supply.
Regional effects of the European carbon market in Portugal
Little attention has been paid to the possible impact of EU ETS in regional terms. However, installations are located in a physical territory, and the specialization of the different regions in the production of diverse goods and services can thus lead to dissimilar economic impacts of the carbon market from a regional 15 Data is from http://www.dgge.pt/ point of view. Figure 6 shows the relative weight of each Portuguese region in the number of installations regulated by the EU ETS and population. 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets (installations) and INE (population) See Appendix for full region names Generally, there is no proportionality between the share of each region in the national population and the share in the number of installations regulated by the EU ETS. For instance, there is one region, B-V, which holds 3,75% of the population and 20.5% of the installations, because in this region there are a large number of small installations; in particular, it has the majority of installations of the Portuguese ceramic sector. In the two major Portuguese cities, Grande Lisboa (GL) and Grande Porto (GP), as expected, the opposite happens: these regions represent 18.8% and 12.2% of the population, respectively, and have only 5.7% and 5.3% of the installations.
We can also trace the relationship between CO 2 emissions and some macroeconomic variables. Figure 7 shows the regional share of allocated permits and national gross value added ( which contributes with a 32,1% to national emissions and only 1.3% to the GVA. We can also see (and confirm with Table A1 in the Appendix) that 80% of the regulated emissions are made by 5 regions, which together represent 52% of national GVA. As in the sectoral analysis, there is a high concentration of regulated emissions in a limited number of regions.
Clearly, the regional emission levels have a low correlation with GVA (the statistical correlation between variables is equal to 0.42, where the P-value is below 5%). This feature can be confirmed by looking at per capita CO 2 emissions (CO 2 pc) and per capita GVA (GVApc). Figure 8 shows that there is a weak correlation between GVApc and CO 2 pc (the equation in the figure is an OLS estimation). Source: Own elaboration using CO 2 regulated emissions data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and GVA and population data in INE.
To better understand the relationship between regional economic activity and CO 2 emissions, it is important to remember that the levels of emissions and allocated permits vary between sectors. Recall that, as shown in Table 3 , the largest emitter in the EU ETS is thermoelectric generation. Thus there is a significant correspondence between the regions with the highest level of emissions and the location of thermoelectric plants: Alentejo Litoral (AL), Grande Lisboa (GL), Península de Setúbal (PS), Médio Tejo (MT) and Grande Porto (GP). The high level of emissions in these regions is therefore related with this type of industry and not with general economic activity.
We can now ascertain the direct impact of the EU ETS in regional accounts. In order to do so we have defined an effort index, consisting of the difference between the emission rights attributed to each region indicates that the sum of installations located in this region received more permits than they used. The eventual proceeds from selling the surplus may then contribute to increase the regional GVA. Likewise, a negative difference indicates that the installations located in this region had to buy permits and therefore transferred part of its GVA to other regions. Table 3 summarizes these effects. The last two columns shows the permit deficits (-) and surpluses (+) by region. The other columns illustrate the regional deficit or surplus by industry. Although regional GVA includes all economic activity that is physically in each area, it should be noted that not all impacts of an increase or decrease in profits due to EU ETS participation occur necessarily within the same region. In particular, many installations belong to national public companies, whose shareholders are spread among different regions. Nonetheless, we believe it is instructive to analyse the regional concentration of EU ETS direct impacts.
As mentioned in section 2, even though the thermoelectric generation sector presented a deficit in 2005, if we consider 2005 and 2006 together, all sectors had a permit surplus. Yet if we do the same analysis by regions, we see that some regions had a deficit and others a surplus, as shown in Figure 9 . Particularly, Alentejo Litoral and Médio Tejo had important deficits (-25% and -10% of total permits, respectively) since the only two Portuguese thermoelectric installations still based on coal are sited there (Sines and Pêgo, respectively). Some other regions presented small deficits (a total of -5.5%) but most had a surplus. It is remarkable that the cities (GL and GP), as well as the next most heavily populated area (PS), had very large surpluses (27%, 34% and 41%, respectively). Thermoelectric installations in these regions had significant surpluses. Source: own elaboration from Table 3 . Table 4 illustrates the regional significance of permit costs or benefits. In the 5 regions that present costs analyze the costs and revenues as a percentage of GVA we see that they are generally not very significant.
The top loser by far is Alentejo Litoral, where costs represent 0.57% of the GVA, whereas the top winner is now Península de Setúbal, with a 0,2% benefit, and the main cities' gain is not so important (Grande Lisboa, for instance, gained only 0,02% of its GVA).
Since most of the emission reduction effort in Portugal is concentrated on the thermoelectric sector, there is in territorial terms a distortion on the energy-producing regions, which assume a disproportionate responsibility for emission control. On the other hand, the regions that do not produce energy have little responsibility for the reduction, although they contribute for the emissions through the consumption processes. Price pass-through, if allowed, could be a significant distributional factor, but so far that has not been the case, as noted in Section 5. Figure 10 shows the different values for consumption and production of electricity at the regional level. Both the total production of electricity and the thermoelectric generation alone are shown. Five regions (PS, MT, Oe, GP and AL) represent 87% of Thermoelectric generation, 75% of electricity generation, and 29% of electricity consumption. Together they account for 80% of the CO2 regulated by the EU ETS and 41% of Portuguese population. The most unequal cases are Alentejo Litoral (AL), with 27% of the national thermal electricity generation and only 2.4% of electricity consumption, and Oeste (Oe), with 16% of thermal electricity generation and only 3% of consumption. On the other hand, we have the opposite situation in Grande Lisboa (GL), which has 18% of electricity consumption and only 0.9% of thermal production. 
Consumption total production
Source: Own elaboration using data available in Directorate-General for Geology and Energy (DGGE).
The second Portuguese National Plan (2008-2012)
Considering the results of the first trading period as well as the difficult path ahead to achieve the established legal targets, it is natural that the second Portuguese National Plan (for the period 2008 and 2012) (NAP II)
would contain a permit reduction. Accordingly, the second Plan issued 152,552 million permits (CO 2 equivalent tons), implying an annual value of 30,510 Mt for the period 2008-2012, which is a decrease of about 17%.
Between the first and second NAP there was also a modification in the industries included in the emissions market, in accordance with new EC rules and some national modifications. For period 2008-2012 part of the ceramic industry is excluded, and units of cogeneration and combustion facilities of the chemical sector are included 16 . Considering equivalent installations in both periods, the decrease in attributed permits is 22,4%. Table 5 shows the sectoral distribution of these reductions. The electricity generation sector will once more have to make the largest reduction effort. This could strengthen the conclusions that we reached for the first plan, namely in terms of the higher damage concentration in the regions where these installations are located. The actual cost will depend on hydrological conditions. Moreover, it should also be mentioned that Portuguese electricity prices are mostly regulated and cannot be freely increased. As costs of providing electricity have increased (due to many factors, including the EU ETS), EDP, the main electricity provider, was by the end of 2008 burdened with a debt (the so called "défice tarifário") of around 2 million euros, to be recovered from consumers, with interest, starting in 2010
The following table is similar to Table 2 , since it presents 2008 data for emissions, permits, and potential permit expenses. The only sector that was "short" was, again, thermoelectric generation, while the country's ETS participation as a whole continues to show a surplus. 16 For more details see NAP II (PNALE II, 2008) . 17 The same problem with cost pass-through is noted for Spain, namely by Oberndorfer(2008) , which points out that this may be one of the reasons stock-market values of electricity firms in that country are inversely correlated with permit prices, unlike in other countries. In energy markets without price regulation, on the other hand, results indicate high levels of passthrough, leading to significant windfall profits from EU ETS participation for the power sector (Sijm et al, 2006) . 
Emission reduction policy analysis
The purpose of this section is to analyse some policy options regarding emissions reductions from both a sectoral and a regional perspective. To this end it is important to look at all sectors, including those outside the EU ETS. Figure 11 contains the weight of each sector in emissions. The largest non-ETS sector is Transport, which accounted for 17% of emissions in 1990 and has since grown to 24%, although other non-ETS sectors are also significant. Unfortunately, none of the Simões et al scenarios considers the possibility of emissions trading, as it does not alter abatement costs. However, it does change compliance costs, since high-cost users can purchase permits abroad instead of abating emissions, thus lowering national compliance expenses. Considering the global nature of GHG emissions, country-specific caps are only the starting point to emissions trading schemes and they need not be achieved rigidly. Thus, the authors' estimated costs, assuming that specific emission targets have to be achieved within the national energy system, are higher than necessary.
Considering all sectors of economic activity, we can trace the regional economic implications of the EU ETS more closely. Figure 12 shows the aggregate sectoral composition of GVA in Portuguese regions. The division used here considers three groups of sectors: I (agriculture, hunting and forestry, fisheries and aquiculture), II (industry including energy and construction) and III (services). There are no regional emissions data available to compare EU ETS regional emissions with total regional emissions. Nonetheless, sectors I and III are largely excluded from the emission cap regulations although they account for an important part of national emissions, as shown in Figure 11 . Thus a regional analysis of the composition of economic activity can provide some additional insights on the relative imbalance between regional abatement efforts. Figure 12 shows, for instance, that sector III in Grande Lisboa (GL), Grande Porto (GP) and Península de Setúbal (PS), represents 85%, 76% and 69% of economic activity, respectively. These are also the main population centers, which leads us to infer that these three regions could be the main emitters of GHG. Therefore, if sector III and households could be covered by the EU ETS or another emission reduction instrument, these regions could carry the highest burden instead of being the most benefited (as was the case in Table 4 ). 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in INE The main conclusion is that the regional effects of the EU ETS during the period 2005-2007, which arise from the specific locations of the main industrial plants covered in the scheme, vary widely, not only because of the uneven stringency of permit allocation among covered sectors, but also because of the different productive specialization of Portuguese regions. The burden of reduction falls on regions which house EU ETS industrial activity, although these may not be the main GHG emitters.
It is true that a system of emissions trading may be unsuitable for most of the uncovered sectors, because the transaction costs of registering and monitoring small emitters would be prohibitive. However, this does not wholly justify the current differentiation in treatment, because other economic instruments could be applicable to these diffuse sectors in order to internalize CO 2 emission costs, like for instance environmental taxes.
Theoretically, emission taxes would be capable of achieving targets in a cost-effective manner, by making sure marginal abatement costs are equal for all emitters. They do, nonetheless, impose much higher costs on emitters than grandfathered permits, which were chosen instead as a starting point in EU emission reduction efforts. If further reductions are to be accomplished, other sectors must be covered, preferably by measures that reach all of them equally. Hence the Senior European Commission official, Jos Delbeke, has announced that EU member states must look seriously at introducing carbon taxation to help cut greenhouse gas emissions; 'the taxation debate is not running at EU level because we have chosen a market, but it can run at national level. Indeed it must, because the EU ETS is not going to do everything' 18 . There has been an increased interest in taxation as an additional approach to cutting emissions in several countries 19 . The superiority of green tax reforms for environmental protection (see Parry et al, 1999 , or Aldy et al, 2009 with the fact that energy taxes in non-European countries are relatively low, makes them an attractive policy option outside Europe (Sterner, 2007 
Conclusions
This work provided a first analysis of the consequences of the EU ETS at the sectoral and regional level for A third set of conclusions deals with the regional impact. As expected, there is a high concentration of regulated emissions in a limited number of regions. Those that specialize on thermoelectricity (in particular, those that have coal based power production) suffered the greatest losses. Even so, these were never higher than 0.6% of regional GVA.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the transport sector, agriculture, households and other services are responsible for a large share of emissions but remain unregulated by the EU ETS. Regions with the greatest share of the tertiary sector in their economic activity are thus benefited (especially because they can often have access to subsidies to improve energy efficiency) in detriment of regions where the activities of the secondary sector predominate, in particular the production of electricity.
The policy implications raised in section 6 calls for a combination of cost-effective instruments: the EU Emission Trading Scheme could be complemented with other mechanisms through a hybrid regulation system, allowing for wide coverage of polluters with reasonable administrative and compliance costs (that is the case in many EU countries and there are several others seriously considering it). This might improve both efficiency and equity of the EU climate change policy, by ensuring that marginal abatement costs tend to equality (so that emissions abatement is done at minimum cost) and by sharing the burden more widely. Also, it could contribute to the new climate change policy agenda around the world both in developed and developing countries.
Future research should focus on a regional-sectoral model of interaction, considering the key sectors, including EU ETS covered and uncovered sectors, or on the use of a General Equilibrium Model for the Portuguese economy that simulates alternative policies. Another important line of work is to provide econometric testing of the relationship between firm-level economic data and emissions (as is done for Germany in Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008) . Source: Own elaboration using data from INE.
